USA - The Agricultural Credit Situation
Author: Danny Klinefelter, Professor and Extension Economist with Texas AgriLife Extension, Texas A&M University Lins to source: http://www.agweb.com/TopProducer/Article.aspx?ID=154365
Serious problems that developed in the agricultural credit situation in 2009 could escalate in 2010–2011.
The earliest problems have occurred for lenders with loan
concentrations in beef, dairy, hogs and poultry. Producers in all the
protein sectors have suffered significant losses for over a year,
resulting in a large increase in non-performing loans. Although there
were few foreclosures in 2009, without a significant turnaround in
income, many dairy and hog loans are in a near crisis situation. Many
producers have lost enough equity that their lenders will be forced to
discontinue financing.
The impact on the agricultural sector will be magnified by the
fact that many dairy and hog operations represent the majority of the
assets for many producers. If the livestock operation fails, all of the
assets of the business will have to be liquidated, including the land
base. In addition, most of the more successful dairy operations are not
in a position where their lender will allow them the leverage up to
purchase the assets of the operations that are liquidating, even at a
significant discount. While dairies tend to fail as individual
businesses, many hog operations are contractually part of integrated
supply chains. Some very well managed hog operations are going to be
liquidated not just because of their own performance, but because their
integrator fails and the entire supply chain goes down with him.
Crop producers have fared fairly well over the past several years,
but many grain producers are likely to have carryover operating debt if
they purchased inputs early in the year when inputs were high and then
had a poor crop or forward priced their crop after prices declined.
Fortunately, most grain producers experienced a run of several years of
above-normal income and pushed cash forward into 2009 for tax reasons.
Now, however, margins going forward appear to be returning to normal
levels.
An increase in the federal biofuels standard world provide a
temporary benefit to grain producers, but it would further exacerbate
the financial problems of livestock producers.
Some borrowers will be able to restructure their loans using
guarantees from USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA), but even this lender
of last resort will require that borrowers demonstrate the ability to
service the loan. Also, many confinement livestock operations have
credit needs that far exceed FSA’s limits.
The reality is that there has been little involuntary exit from
agriculture in the last 4 or 5 years. Unfortunately, extended boom
periods tend to be followed by a cleansing period of about 3 years and
a hangover effect can extend beyond that. It has been my observation
the half-life of the lessons learned from a financial crisis is about
10 years. A good example is the importance that lenders place on
profitability analysis. After the farm financial crisis of the 1980s,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency found that 70 percent of
agricultural banks were evaluating borrowers’ accrual adjusted net
income in 1990. By 1995, the number had dropped to 50 percent as
conditions improved, memories faded and competition heated up.
Remember that the function of a competitive market is to drive the
economic return to the average producer to breakeven through supply and
demand responses in both input and output markets. In equilibrium, the
top-end producers are profitable and growing, the average are hanging
in there, and the bottom end are losing money and being forced to exit
the industry. Business success and survival depend on continuous
improvement at a pace necessary to stay out of the back of the pack.
The same is true for lenders. During the boom periods, growth is
strong, profits are increasing, loan losses are low and competition
among lenders is intense. As farm income deteriorates, loan problems
begin to mount and commercial lenders begin to pull in their horns as
they start experiencing loan losses and their lending staff gets bogged
down in dealing with adverse credit.
Fortunately, really serious industrywide problems occur only every
20 to 30 years. The last time was the farm financial crisis of the
1980s. Unfortunately, some signs point to a period of financial stress
extending over several years. How severe the problems become will
depend primarily on three factors:
- How soon net farm income rebounds
- What happens to land values
- How soon and how much interest rates increase
Although financial regulators and Congress are always more
reactive than proactive, their actions significantly affect how lenders
operate. The current administration is increasing the money supply and
providing more liquidity in the financial markets, but commercial bank
and Farm Credit System regulators are aggressively working to ensure
that lenders recognize and mitigate risks. Also, the increase in bank
failures and FDIC losses—in part because of higher limits on insured
deposits—has prompted the FDIC to recommend that banks prepay their
FDIC premiums for the next 3 years to rebuild the insurance fund.
To mitigate risk, bank regulatory agencies are considering raising
minimum capital standards. The Farm Credit Administration is also
focusing on minimum capitalization and profitability levels for the
Farm Credit Associations. The result will be that regardless of the
underlying cost of funds, risk premiums and interest rate spreads will
have to increase for all commercial lenders.
A major regulatory change is that loan loss reserve requirements
are now expected to be more forward looking and anticipatory and less
dependent on recent history. Only a few years ago, regulators and
accounting firms were criticizing lenders for excess loss reserves that
were built to absorb the longer term cyclical downturns. Some lenders
that were required to roll out what were deemed “excess” reserves are
now being criticized for either not being adequately reserved or
needing higher capital levels to absorb shock events.
The current climate has affected lender behavior. First, all
lenders have less appetite for risk. This is being manifested in
several ways:
- Lenders are requiring more and better
documentation of the information provided by borrowers, as well as
closer monitoring of performance after loans are made.
- There are fewer exceptions to underwriting standards.
- Emphasis
has increased on repayment capacity, including more analysis of accrual
adjusted net income rather than just cash basis tax returns. The Farm
Financial Standards Council has recognized for nearly two decades that
cash basis accounting can lag true profitability by 2 years or more in
terms of both upturns and downturns.
- Working capital and
liquidity are also more important. Cash may be king, but a business can
be making payments and going broke by refinancing, selling assets,
building accounts payable and deferring the replacement of capital
assets. So staying current on payments may not be enough by itself to
keep borrowers’ loans out of trouble.
- Repricing terms are
shorter—a loan may be amortized over 15 or 20 years but repriced every
5 years. This practice is driven largely by the lender’s ability to
match fund the maturity of the loan or to sell the loan in the
secondary market.
- Higher risk premiums are being built
into interest rates. In part, this reflects that inadequate premiums
had previously been priced into higher risk loans, often because of
competition.
- Advance rates are lower, such as requirements for higher down payment or equity.
- More emphasis is being placed on borrowers’ risk management practices.
- Borrowers
with larger credit needs are having more difficulty getting loans
larger than their primary lender’s hold positions or legal lending
limit, as potential participants are experiencing their own problems
and demanding better documentation and quality.
- The use
of FSA guarantees has increased significantly. Nationally, operating
loan guarantee volume was up over 30 percent and mortgage guarantees up
9 percent. FSA actually ran out of funding for the operating loan
guarantees in 2009. The funding for both programs has been increased by
20 percent for 2010, but the carryover from 2009 is going to have to
come out of that as well. Borrowers who will require FSA assistance
must start early. FSA’s staff will be swamped, and if demand increases
as expected the funding could run out before the year is over.
These changes reinforce the importance of several factors. First,
interest rates and debt structure can be as important as debt levels in
terms of the impact of debt on producer’s financial performance, and
rates are subject to changing much more rapidly. One of the current
concerns in financial markets is the potential for increases in
interest rates and inflation as a result of the increased federal debt
and creation of new entitlement programs. Interest rates are about as
low as they can get, so the only way to go is up. If the economy
rebounds and the private sector reenters the capital debt markets,
there is a potential for a crowding-out effect. The federal debt will
be issued and refinanced, but the rates are determined by the level of
competition in the market. Recently, the federal government has had
little competition. Since nearly 40 percent of the federal debt is held
by foreign investors, the problem could be exacerbated if inflation
occurs and the dollar is devalued, which would make U.S. Treasuries
less attractive to those investors except at much higher rates. The
Federal Reserve could end up between the proverbial rock and a hard
place, needing to raise interest rates to curb inflation, but at the
same time not wanting to stall economic growth. While interest rates
are likely to increase, they probably will not go up significantly in
2010. The current economic recovery doesn’t have enough legs under it
and I have not yet seen a new economic engine emerging.
Another increasingly important factor in the credit decision
process is the borrower’s proven management ability. Lenders recognize
that management is the primary determinant of success or failure, but
it is also extremely hard to quantify in risk rating models. Many
studies have found that the top quarter of producers in terms of
profitability tend to only be about 5 percent better than average,
whether in terms of costs, production or marketing. But they do it over
and over again. By way of analogy, remember that the future Hall of
Fame baseball player with a .300 lifetime batting average gets only 1
more hit every 20 times at bat than the player who hits .250 and just
manages to hang on.
Of the different management attributes, risk management ability
will become more important in separating the winners from the losers as
increased volatility gets priced into or pushed down the value chain.
Among the most obvious examples are situations that have occurred are
where grain elevators, merchandisers and fertilizer dealers either have
changed their internal policies or are being limited by their own
lenders in terms of the exposure they can take on futures contracts or
inventories. If they can’t manage the risk for their customer through
forward contracts, hedging, or prepurchasing inventory without
prepayment, the price risk gets shifted to the producer.
Another major issue for producers, lenders, suppliers and buyers
of agricultural products is counter party risk. This is the risk of the
other party to a contract failing to keep their end of the agreement.
Bankruptcies by ethanol plants, processors, integrators, grain
elevators, fertilizer dealers and others have left a number of
producers with major losses and their lenders with new problem loans.
As for loan losses on a broad scale, the ultimate financial impact
on the financial health of agricultural sector will be determined by
and reflected in land values. The basic reason is that 87 percent of
total farm assets are in real estate. With the increase in land values
in recent years the total debt:asset ratio for the agricultural sector
is at historically low levels, but the number can be very deceiving.
First, 70 percent of farm operations carry no debt. The use of credit
is more concentrated among capital intensive and larger operations that
depend primarily on farm income for debt repayment. Most of the shift
away from debt over the last 10 years has occurred in farms and ranches
generating less than $500,000 annual gross sales. Add to this the fact
that 42 percent of land in farms is owned by non-operator landlords and
of the 58 percent owned by farm operators, 61.3 percent is owned by
farmers with less than $250,000 annual gross sales. Because both the
net worth and the underlying collateral for many farm loans, even
operating loans, is real estate and because the majority of farm debt
and farm income is concentrated on commercial scale farms and ranches,
the value of land is critical to the risk of loss in the event of
default faced by agricultural lenders. The market value of land is
determined at the margin—the prices of land sold. If farm income drops
and debt servicing problems occur, forced sales will increase. If able
buyers get nervous about reduced incomes prospects and believe land
values could fall, they will sit on the sidelines. This would
exacerbate the problem and land values would fall even further.
Changes in land values obviously aren’t evenly distributed. Land
type, quality and location differ significantly, and so will the market
impacts. Declines in value have already been occurring in recreational
and transitional land markets, and on marginal quality agricultural
land. If values fall by less than 10 percent from their peak the impact
will be minimal, but 20 percent would result in significant problems,
and more than 30 percent could result in a restructuring of the
industry similar to the 1980s. One of the major problems is that
declines in land values not only result in foreclosures and loan
losses, they also decrease the market value equity of all land owners.
Unfortunately, markets tend to overreact on both the upside and
downside. Alan Greenspan referred to this response as irrational
exuberance/fear and said that 80 percent of market economics are
psychology. Experience has shown that when it comes to predicting
financial problems, the debt:income ratio is a much better leading
indicator than the debt:asset ratio. For example, the charts at the end
of the article show that the debt:income ratio indicated problems
starting to develop in 1977, while the debt:asset ratio didn’t start
reflecting any negative until 1981. The question is whether the drop in
net farm income from $87 billion in 2008 to a forecasted $54 billion in
2009 is an aberration or the beginning of an extended downturn. If net
farm income remains below $60 billion in 2010 and 2011, there will be
problems. If it falls below $50 billion, the problems will be serious.
Another source of credit problems is that over the past 10 years,
some lenders have moved into new types and areas of lending where they
had no previous experience or expertise. In good economic times, no
problems were apparent, but as conditions deteriorate, the weaknesses
are beginning to appear. Unfortunately, at this point it’s often too
late. Not only can loans in these areas jeopardize the lending
institution; but, performing borrowers also experience greater
difficulty in getting their needs serviced as the lending institution
moves to limit its risk, increase its spreads to offset losses and its
lending staff’s time becomes consumed by fighting fires.
Obviously some areas and lenders are experiencing more problems
than others, not necessarily because they are poorer lenders or their
borrowers are poorer managers, but because of the nature of their
market and location. Current examples include drought- or water-damaged
areas, concentrated livestock areas and regions with large amounts of
transitional property.
These changes point to several lessons for producers:
- A lender’s request for more accurate and
complete information should not be viewed as questioning the borrower’s
character; it’s just a good business practice.
- Tougher
credit standards will almost always follow new ownership or management
of a lending institution. Such changes often indicate not that the new
management is too demanding, but that the former management was too
lax, which often explains why there is new ownership/management.
- Many
of the stricter credit standards being adopted by lenders can be
directly attributed to legislation passed during the 1980s that
provided for additional borrowers’ rights, mandatory debt
restructuring, more liberalized bankruptcy laws and the increased
threat of lender liability lawsuits. In response, lenders have been
forced to be more selective about whom they finance. Because litigation
usually arises from situations in which borrowers are highly leveraged
or in financial trouble, it has become more difficult for higher risk
borrowers to qualify for credit or for lenders to continue financing if
a borrower’s financial situation deteriorates significantly. Just as
malpractice lawsuits have raised the cost of health care, the threat of
legal action has changed the lending environment and caused lenders to
become more cautious and conservative.
Many lenders have felt the impact of the recession through losses
on participations purchased in loans originated outside the state.
There are several banks and farm credit associations where over half of
their charge-offs in 2009 and a significant portion of their adverse
credit volume have resulted from loan participations. Loans on ethanol
plants and commercial real estate are obvious problem areas. Others
include loans for purposes outside the lender’s area of expertise and
loans where lenders relied too heavily on the lead lender or financial
rating services.
Larger banks and farm credit associations that have defined
benefit retirement programs are under additional stress to maintain
profitability and rebuild capital. In some instances, 25 percent or
more of their net earnings are being required to rebuild retirement
funds that were deplenished by the collapse of the financial markets.
The past 2 years in commodity, real estate and financial markets
have made it abundantly clear that changes can occur quickly. We have
also learned that Black Swan events are real. The tails of economic and
financial distributions are larger than the assumptions of a normal
distribution. Most risk models capture only “normal” periods, and that
includes the rating services such as Moody, Dun and Bradstreet. This
experience has several lessons that need to be heeded in the future:
- Econometric models tend to be data dependent
and backward looking. Boards and managers need to rely on judgment and
experience and learn to look for leading indicators outside their
immediate environment.
- Total enterprise risk management
is critical, but implementing it is both expensive and easier said than
done. Even the most sophisticated financial institutions are still
basically silo risk managers.
- Although linear trends are
good indicators of behavior and performance, they seriously understate
the potential rate of change created by the external environment,
including the impact of technological change. Tipping points often
cause exponential rather than linear changes for both upturns and
downturns. Timing is critical—for getting in, expanding, cutting back
or getting out. The studies I have seen and my own experience indicate
that timing is the main difference that separates the top 10 percent
from the rest of the top 25 percent of managers and businesses.
- Employee
and management incentive compensation systems need to be evaluated and
redesigned. People ultimately do what they are incentivized to do. We
have learned over time that incentives that focus too much on volume or
cost minimization can be disasters. Even systems that focus on
profitability have often failed to effectively factor in the
risk:reward relationship, not just for the individual but also for the
business. Prime examples are Wall Street trader bonus structures, the
combining of commercial banking and investment banking enabled by the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the lack of regulation of derivative
markets, and executive golden parachutes that pay off even if the
business is unsuccessful.
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